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A GAME THEORY OF ORGANIZATIONAL ECOLOGY
A Model of Managerial Inertia and Market Selection
ABSTRACT
This paper merges two theoretical perspectives in a mathematical game model: industria
organization on the one hand, which basically is the economic theory of market competition
and firm strategies, and organizational ecology on the other, which is a major sociological
tradition that studies the evolution of organizational populations. The merger is instrumental in
analyzing a key question in organization studies: what is the role of flexibility, inertia and
efficiency in facilitating firm performance in a selection environment, in terms of both
profitability and survival? Particularly, we argue that game theory can offer a mathematical
model of organizational ecology. Such a game-theoretic model reveals that an inert firm may
push a flexible rival from the market, even if the inert market leader faces a cost
disadvantage. Moreover, this may happen in a munificent environment. That is, cut-throat
rivalry can be the result of strategic competition only - being facilitated by organizational
inertia. This paper operationalizes relative inertia by modeling managerial resistance against
downsizing. The model clearly supports the key claim of organizational ecology that relative
inertia facilitates rather than impedes survival chances.
1INTRODUCTION
Organizational ecology (OE) is a sociological theory of what happens to and within
populations of organizations. OE has produced an impressive and still rapidly increasing
number of empirical studies (Baum, 1996). For example, the number of studies that have
tested density-dependence hypotheses reaches infinity. No doubt, the empirical tradition that
has been established by OE, is an important enrichment of organization sciences. In recent
years, a cry for increased theoretical precision has emerged, however. For example, Bau
(1996: 107-108) concludes his impressive review of OE with a plea for such precision with
reference to the need for "asking new kinds of research questions that develop links with other
streams in organization theory". We believe that the organizational subdisciplines within
economics are specifically promising in this respect. Here we fully agree with Amburgey &
Rao (1996: 1280), who in a recent special issue of the Academy of Management Journal
observe that organizational economics is one area of overlap with OE that remains to be
explored. This is precisely what this paper does. In effect, we merge OE with the dominant
subbranche of industrial organization (IO): game theory. We strongly believe that the
mathematical tools of game theory are particularly applicable to OE-issues. That is, the very
nature of game theory makes this modeling technique well-suited to explore the impact of
between-firm (or between-population) differences in inertia on direct competition and
ultimately on firm performance and survival.
Thematically, this paper confronts the standard 'flexibility and efficiency favor selection'
logic with OE-reasoning. Carroll & Harrison (1993: 92) summarize the efficiency-favors-
survival story line by arguing that "[t]his logic holds, first, that when an organizational form
emerges and spreads, it is because of the form's efficiency and, secondly, that when an
organizational form disappears, it is because of its inefficiency" (Carroll & Harrison, 1993: 92).
In a similar vein, advocates of the strategic choice theory argue that flexibility helps a firm to
survive in a competitive environment. The theoretical originality of OE comes from the
counterintuitive argument that this standard story may not hold true. This is reflected in
Hannan & Freeman's (1984) well-known inertia theory. However, the theory of the
consequences of inertia on survival is still in need of much refinement. In effect, the
relationships between relative inertia, organizational size and firm survival are highly complex
and ill-understood (Hannan & Freeman, 1989). The current paper presents a game-theoretic
model that goes into this complicated issue.
So, the main purpose of this paper is to mark a first step into analyzing the inertia-
selection nexus, particularly the consequences of inertia on the survival of organizations,
through a mathematical theory of OE. To achieve this aim, we adopt a research strategy that
is new in the context of OE. More specifically, we will show that important insights on this
issue can be gained by inserting the crucial OE-concept of inertia into a game-theoretic model
of competition. Game theory is by now gaining popularity in strategic management, as two
special issues of the Strategic Management Journal (in 1988 and 1991) indicate. To our
knowledge, game theory - being the hard core of the economic tradition in modern industrial
organization (Tirole, 1988) - has as yet not been applied to central OE-issues. From the very
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nature of game theory, being a mathematical tool to analyze strat gic interaction in a
competitive setting, we believe that this approach is particularly suited to develop a
mathematical foundation of OE. Here, we complement Péli, Bruggeman, Masuch & Nualláin's
(1994) application of first-order logic.
In the first section we stress the potential synergies which can be realized by cross-
fertilizing the insights from OE with the framework of game-theoretic industrial organization.
Then, we summarize the inertia debate so as to set the scene for presenting three thought-
provoking propositions that follow from inertia-related reasoning. The next section introduces
the essentials of a game-theoretic Cournot model that incorporates a manifestation of
organizational inertia, particularly managerial resistance against downsizing, in a selection
framework. In addition, a number of counterintuitive results of the model will be presented. An
appraisal and selection of further research issues conclude the paper.
ORGANIZATIONAL ECOLOGY AND INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION
We have argued elsewhere that the potentials for cross-fertilization between OE and IO are
substantial (Boone & Van Witteloostuijn, 1995). The reason is that understanding the
dynamics of industry evolution is an important research issue in both IO and OE. Moreover,
OE incorporates economic concepts such as competition, and often reveals a resemblance to
economic analysis. Surprisingly enough, such a cross-fertilizing endeavour has - as yet - not
been undertaken. In our view, this lack of cross-fertilization may well be caused by a key
misunderstanding of the merits of IO-research, as expressed in important OE-contributions.1
The misunderstanding resides in the fact that since the 1970s much IO-literature has
been dominated by the application of game theory to rivalry in oligopolistic markets (Tirole,
1988). Apparently, the results of this applied game theory tend to depend critically upon the
assumptions underlying the game model at hand (Shapiro, 1989; and Sutton, 1991). Hannan
& Carroll (1992: 22) comment that "[t]he analytic results apparently lack robustness". The
critique is that IO-scholars have therefore focused their research efforts on specific markets,
which allow for adaptation of the oligopoly model to the idiosyncrasies of the specific setting.
Of course, this 'ultra-micro work' (Sutton, 1991: 6) impedes understanding of the observed
statistical regularities over industries. This observed lack of robustness is one of the main
reasons why cross-fertilization between IO and OE has not yet occurred (Hannan & Carroll,
1992). The implied characterization is, however, partly besides the mark. For example,
theoretical and empirical regularities abound in a number of key contributions to the
Handbook of Industrial Organization (Schmalensee & Willig, 1989), examples being the
monopolizing impact of commitments (Gilbert, 1989) and the thirty empirical regularities that
have emerged from industry studies (Schmalensee, 1989). Particularly the work of Sutton
3     Does the OE-argument apply to the evolution of sciences - interpreted as populations of paradigms or theories - as2
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(1991) is a convincing case in point. Sutton (1991) proves in his masterpiece that game theory
can be applied to develop robust predictions on the level of industry concentration, which
hold across a wide class of reasonable models (and thus allow application to a broad set of
different industries).
Setting aside this misunderstanding, game-theoretic modeling may contribute significantly
to OE for three reasons. The first reason relates to differences in the analytical tools that are -
as a routine! - applied to explicate theories of IO and OE. Modern IO-theory is mainly based2
on formal mathematical modeling, whereas OE's foundation is carried by 'natural language'. It
is clear that "[i]nconsistency, incoherence, or other defects in logic are difficult to detect when
a theory is stated in natural language" (Péli, Bruggeman, Masuch & Ó Nualláin, 1994: 571). In
this respect, it is interesting to note that in the above-quoted paper Hannan & Freeman's
article 'Structural inertia and organizational change' (1984) is formalized in first-order logic,
which enabled the discovery of a number of logical defects in the latter's theory of inertia.
Obviously, mathematical modeling is one way to avoid such logical defects.
Secondly, and more important, competition is a central concept in both IO and OE. It is
fair to say, however, that the theoretical elaboration of the concept and process of competition
in OE is rather limited. OE recognizes that two forms of competition can be distinguished:
indirect and direct competition (Barnett & Amburgey, 1990; and Hannan & Carroll, 1992).
Indirect or diffuse competition arises from the fact that actors influence each other because
they compete for the same limited r sources (Hannan & Carroll, 1992). In other words, "[s]uch
competition occurs when organizations reduce another's viability by depleting a limited
common supply of resources" (Barnett & Amburgey, 1990: 80). Note that diffuse competition
does not require any social ties between actors. In addition, competitive constraints exist
whether or not the actors recognize their interdependence as competitors. Direct competition
implies mutual recognition of the salience of the competitive moves of other actors, and is
therefore tantamount to conflict or rivalry (Hannan & Carroll, 1992). Until now, OE-research
has mainly focused on diffuse competitive processes. As Hannan & Carroll (1992: 190)
comment, "[o]ur arguments in this book emphasized diffuse competition, processes that link
the life chances of organizations that may or may not interact as direct competitors by, for
instance, taking into account each other's actions as rivals. Instead of trying to measure the
intensity of diffuse competition, we used arguments about competitive processes to develop
implications for the relationship between density and the vital rates of organizational
populations". In our view, a theory which is mainly based on processes of competition and
legitimation should incorporate both diffuse and direct competition. In this respect, IO is very
informative as economic theory has a long tradition of describing and modeling many
(implications of) different types of competition - ranging from perfect (diffuse) competition to
oligopolistic (direct) competition (Tirole, 1988; and Fudenberg & Tirole, 1991).
Thirdly, although Hannan & Freeman's (1984) argument that selection favors inertia i
thought-provoking, the theory on the consequences of inertia (and organizational change) on
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survival is still in its infancy. In effect, the relationships between relative inertia, organizational
size, change and survival appear to be highly complex and ill-understood (Hannan &
Freeman, 1989). As Hannan & Freeman (1989: 90) comment, "[o]rganizational selection
operates on many dimensions besides reproducibility of structure. If selection pressures on
specific features of structure are sufficiently strong, organizations with the characteristics
appropriate to the environment are favored even if they have low levels of reproducibility. By
the same token, environments in which change is turbulent and uncertain may not constitute a
systematic regime of selection; the traits that are favored may shift frequently enough that no
clear trend emerges. Such settings may favor organizational forms that can take quick
advantage of new opportunities. The capacity to respond quickly to new opportunities
presumably competes with the capacity to perform reliably and accountably".3
Apart from this fundamental consideration, inertia theory is limited in scope as it neglects
the likely influence of inertia on the degree of direct competition between organizations within
the same population. Recall that inertial pressures stem from a variety of external and internal
constraints (Hannan & Freeman, 1977), such as investment in capacity or any other sunk
cost, organizational history or culture, limits on the internal information received by decision
makers, and (sunk) entry and exit barriers (Hannan & Freeman, 1977; and Haveman, 1993).
Game-theoretic modeling on strategic competition suggests that firms consciously manipulate
inertia-increasing strategic moves in order to deter entry and to alleviate direct competition. A
nice example is the commitment notion (Dixit, 1982; and Ghemawat, 1991): only irreversible
investment - which by the definition of commitment implies reduced flexibility - can operate as
a credible strategic move. A second, and related, case in point is the incurement of
endogenous sunk costs, such as advertising outlays, to build up market share (Sutton, 1991).
Sutton (1991) shows that the competitive escalation of advertising outlays forces second-tier
firms to exit and may, eventually, generate a dual industry structure with a few leading firms
and a large number of small, specialized and nonadvertising firms. The key point is that IO
has an open eye for the commitment-flexibility trade-off (Spencer & Brander, 1992). This
paper's model, too, has something to say on this trade-off issue by allowing for the calculation
of an 'optimal' degree of flexibility or inertia. But before going into the model, we first
summarize the inertia debate.
THE INERTIA DEBATE
The inertia argument
The central tenet in the strategic management literature is that incumbent firms should
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change their strategies and structures so as to adopt organizational 'blueprints' (Hannan &
Freeman, 1977) which facilitate flexibility. For instance, firms should replace their
'bureaucratic blueprint' with a 'network blueprint'. An illustrative case in point are studies on
organizational decline suggesting that 'strategic paralysis' (D'Aveni, 1989a), which is a
manifestation of inert strategic behavior, foreshadows organizational failure. Broadly speaking,
two important assumptions are (implicitly) made by adherents of the adaptation (or strategic
choice) model of organizational change: (1) organizations are able to implement such radical
transformations with success; and (2) flexibility increases profitability and ultimately survival
chances. This typical twin of assumptions is clear from standard text books in strategic
management such as Johnson & Scholes (1993). The validity of both strategic choice
assumptions, however, can be questioned.4
The first assumption is not realistic according to the organizational ecology theory of
organizations (OE). OE argues that organizations are hard pressed to adjust their 'blueprint'
as they feature relative inertia: that is, they lag behind changes in the environment (Hannan &
Freeman, 1984). This is not to say that organizations never change, but rather that
adjustments are rare and appear only after significant delays. So, organizations tend to be
inert relative to environmental turbulence. Additionally, OE suggests that organizational
change, if possible at all, does increase the failure rate. The reason is that the impact of
changing the core features of an organization is equivalent to creating a new organization. As
a consequence, "[o]rganizational change tend[s] to 'reset the clock', xp sing the organization
once again to the 'liability of newness'" (Swaminathan & Delacroix, 1991: 681). Indeed, a
number of scholars observed that failure rates increased after organizations implemented
major structural changes (Freeman & Hannan, 1990; Haveman, 1990; and Amburgey, Kelley
& Barnett, 1993). The bottom line is that "[a]s the large number of regularly occurring
organizational failures indicates, adaptation models are limited in their abilities to explain
organizational change" (Carroll & Harrison, 1993: 93). OE therefore argues that organizational
change follows mainly from the replacement of one organizational blueprint with another,
rather than through adaptation of individual organizations (Hannan & Freeman, 1989; and
Carroll & Harrison, 1993).
The second assumption is based on the general retrospective economic rationality
argument, as commonly applied to the rise and fall of organizational forms (Carroll & Harrison,
1993). This is the argument that efficiency facilitates firm performance and survival, whereas
the opposite holds true for inefficiency. Nowadays, for instance, the new network forms of
organization are deemed to be highly efficient - due to their flexibility - compared to the ol
'bureaucratic blueprint' organizations. In our view, such an assumption is somewhat
precarious. Although an increasing number of authors speculates that the 'dynamic network
organization' will be the main organizational form in the twenty-first century (Miles & Snow,
61984; and Dyer & Ouchi, 1993), until now virtually nothing is known about the circumstances
that promote and sustain network forms (Miles & Snow, 1992). We agree with Powell (1990:
327) that "[a] good deal more research is needed on the durability of networks". To be sure,
we do not suggest that efficiency and flexibility are not important. However, we oppose
against the simplistic argument that flexibility is the only key to efficiency and (thus) to
organizational survival.
In this respect, again, OE offers a very informative opposing benchmark. As already
mentioned above, relative inertia (i.e., the opposite of flexibility) is a central concept in the
Darwinian selection theory of OE (Hannan & Freeman, 1989; and Boone & Van Witteloostuijn,
1995). The argument of relative inertia implies that the outside world selects organizational
blueprints, and that the dynamics of diversity can be understood by focusing on the founding
and mortality rates of those blueprints. Moreover, OE posits that inertia is not only a
precondition for Darwinian selection, but - even more important - also a consequence
(Hannan & Freeman, 1984). In other words, selection favors organizational forms
characterized by relatively inert structures. The underlying logic runs as follows (Hannan &
Freeman, 1984). First, organizations have to be reliable: organizations can only be reliable
suppliers of goods and services if they operate on the basis of routines that guide their
functioning. Second, organizations have to be accountable for their activities and
performance. Accountability also requires stable rules and procedures. Third, organizational
reliability and accountability can only be guaranteed if organizational structures are highly
reproducible. The routines, rules and procedures determining reliability and accountability
must stay in place over time. Selection pressures will work in this direction: hence, rigid and
viable blueprints are selected (Boeker, 1988).
The effects of reliability, accountability and reproducibility cumulate into the argument that
"[t]he modern world favors collective actors that can demonstrate or at least reasonably claim
a capacity for reliable performance and can account rationally for their actions. So it favors
organizations over other kinds of collectives and favors certain kinds of organizations over
others, since not all organizations have these properties in equal measure. Selection within
organizational populations tends to eliminate organizations with low reliability and
accountability. .. Thus we assume that selection in populations of organizations in moder
societies favors forms with high reliability of performance and high levels of accountability"
(Hannan & Freeman, 1989: 74). Apparently, we are left with an intriguing contradictory view
on the consequences of inertia (or flexibility). Blending the assumptions of the strategic choice
framework and OE suggests that firms are faced with a complex dilemma: that is, they need
to be flexible and inert at the same time in order to survive in the long run (see also
Burgelman, 1991). Moreover, this trade-off points to the possible existence of an 'optimal'
level of inertia (or flexibility). Unfortunately, hardly any systematic research has been done on
the central tenets of both research strands.
Managerial inertia
Broadly speaking, inertia can operate at three levels of analysis: the system (or population),
the organizational and the managerial level. System inertia may be the result of the existence
7of path dependencies in the competitive process - defined as the situation where prior
decisions, choices or actions affect current and future behavior of the system (Carroll &
Harrison, 1993). In the case of technology, for instance, "[p]ath dependence can occur when
adoption of a given technology contains advantages because of the previous number of
adopters" (Carroll & Harrison, 1993: 92). Such path dependence may lead to the peculiar
result that inferior technologies - such as the QWERTY typewriter keyboard, the color
television system in the U.S., and the VHS recording technology - become and remain
dominant despite of the availability of more efficient alternatives (Carroll & Harrison, 1993).
Note that this concept of path dependence is borrowed from the economic theories of network
externalities (Katz & Shapiro, 1985 & 1986; and Farrell & Saloner, 1986). That is, switching
costs at the demand side, which result from network economies, may impede firms from
introducing superior technologies. Other examples of inertia at the population level are
industry exit and entry barriers.
Organizational inertia relates to variations in the force of inertia among organizations
within the same population. For instance, such variations may be the result of organizational
size and age differences (Hannan & Freeman, 1989) or differences in capital intensity.
Another source of variation may be the well-established phenomenon of resistance to chang
on an organization's work floor, as treated in each text book on organizational behavior (suc
as Robbins, 1993). Related to organizational inertia is the observation that inertia may also
operate at the level of key actors - or the dominant coalition - within the organization (Hannan
& Freeman, 1989). In this respect, Hannan & Freeman's (1989: 67-68) reference to internal
politics is particularly revealing: "internal politics contribute to inertia. Altering structures
upsets political equilibria. When resources controlled by an organization are fixed, structural
change requires reallocating resources among subunits; so at least some subunits are likely
to resist any proposed reorganization. ... Any negative political response will generate short-
run political costs that may be high enough that decision makers will forgo the planned
reorganization" (emphases added). This paper focuses on the ultimate reorganization:
downsizing. Then, downsizing comes with high political costs through resistance from those
organizational participants - work floor and management - who are confronted with
retrenchment, whereas expansion tends to be received with applause by those who may
grow.
This argument is translated into the assumption that a manager of a firm maximizes a
combination of profit and sales, which implies a deviation from orthodox profit-maximizing
behavior. In this paper, we focus on one specific form of asymmetric managerial inertia: tha
is, key actors, on the one hand, like to manage growing firms in terms of sales and, on the
other hand, hate to downsize. Specifically, this preference implies asymmetric inertia, as the
positive utility from sales growth impedes the management's incentive to downsize but
increases the management's willingness to expand, even if this implies that profit is sacrificed.
So, on the one hand, a 'growth-loving manager' is willing to accept that increases in sales
volume come at the expense of profit. Moreover, on the other hand, the 'downward' inertia
implies a cost of change in the sense that a reduction of sales volume produces a isutility
for the management of the firm.
8The empirical validity of this crucial behavioral assumption is firmly established in
organizational research. Here a number of interesting studies have appeared in both the
economic and sociological literature. On the issue of sales growth motives Scherer & Ross
(1990: 50), for example, argue that "[although executive salaries and bonuses are correlated
with both firm size and the level of profits, the size correlations tend to be the stronger of the
two. Consequently, executives might be willing to sacrifice profitability at the margin to
enhance sales and hence compensation" (emphasis added). Similarly, the well-known
industrial organization theorist Tirole (1988: 34-35) points to "a widespread feeling that in
practice ... managers have other objectives (e.g., maximizing the firm's size and growth
and the perquisites of the managerial position). ... For instance, the shareholders' incomplete
information ... may allow the managers to inflate the need for personnel" (emphases added).
This "feeling" is since long recognized in the organization sciences literature, as is clear from
the classic work on goal conflict by Cyert & March (1963) and the continuing attention to
motivational and goal setting issues in text books on organizational behavior (Robbins, 1993)
and strategic management (Johnson & Scholes, 1993).
From an empirical angle cumulative evidence supports the claim that pure profit
maximization does not characterize firms. Two branches of literature are particularly worth
mentioning here. First, direct tests of managers' objectives in the tradition of managerial
economics have revealed that profit maximization alone does not guide managerial behavior.
Two early examples of direct evidence on the sales maximization hypothesis are Hall (1967)
and Lackman & Craycroft (1974). Peck (1988) reports the results of a survey into corporate
objectives among 1,000 American and 1,031 Japanese top managers: two findings are that
increasing market share ranks third in the American and second in the Japanese subsample,
whereas return on investment is first among American and third among Japanese top
managers. Second, indirect evidence comes from studies of managerial behavior in the
context of principal-agent arguments. A large number of studies into managerial
compensation, in both IO and organization sciences literatures [two recent examples being
Jensen & Murphy (1990) and Lambert, Larcker & Weigelt (1991), respectively] have revealed
that executive bonuses and salaries are associated with both firm size and profit level, with
the size correlations being the stronger of the two. The importance of sales growth as a
motivation for management is also supported by evidence on the explanation of 'bad'
acquisitions (Shleifer & Vishny, 1988; and Morck, Shleifer & Vishny, 1990). Evidence from
organization sciences contributions, too, cearly indicates that managers prefer volume.
Particularly, studies of firms' growth point out that "growth is frequently sought directly
because it facilitates the internal management of an organization" (Whetten, 1987: 30).
Three inertia-related propositions
As was explained above, from an OE-perspective the key argument is that relative inerti
facilitates organizational survival. We will now formulate three propositions that may follow
from this OE-argument. Here, the general nature of our propositions is specified to fit with this
paper's model by operationalizing the key elements in parentheses. First, the OE's inertia
theory suggests that day-to-day profit-maximizing behavior is counterproductive, since such
9     Again, there is more in IO than this standard argument, examples being the models that take account of5
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guiding principle is closely related to flexibility. With profit-maximizing behavior, a firm adapts
its processes, structures and strategies in function of emerging profit opportunities. This is the
standard argument in the neo-classical (IO) theory of the firm (Holmstrom & Tirole, 1989). All
that a firm is doing, is meant to adapt to changing circumstances in order to maximize
profitability. Agency theory fits in this tradition, too. In the end, agency modeling retains the
ultimate firm objective of profit maximization, albeit taking into account such complexities as
information costs and incentive structures. In the context of the current paper, the standard
IO-argument is that a firm will move its production volume up and down with increasing and
decreasing aggregated market demand so as to maximize its profitability. Here, Holmstrom &5
Tirole (1989: 103) argue that "incentives should not be connected with quantity choice and the
profit maximization paradigm remains valid in spite of agency problems". In OE-reasoning, this
implies the type of flexibility that reduces the firm's reliability and reproducibility, and so
survival chances. In the retrenchment context of the current paper, the argument may be that
work floor motivation and operational routines break down through downsizing (Pfeffer, 1994).
Basically, OE argues that selection may operate on many other dimensions than pure
profitabil ty alone. In this context, Hannan & Freeman (1989: 20) even set aside optimization
reasoning as a viable route for explaining selection processes. In the context of the current
paper, the OE-argument implies that nonprofit-maximizing behavior as a result of managerial
resistance against downsizing may help the firm in its battle for selection. This argument
induces Proposition 1.
PROPOSITION 1. A profit-maximizing (i.e., managerially inert) firm may well be
outcompeted by a nonprofit-maximizing (i.e., flexible) rival. In the
extreme, the latter firm may even survive at the expense of the
former.
Proposition 1 is a clear example of an OE-argument that goes against any traditional IO-
intuition. This counterintuitive line of reasoning can be extrapolated further by introducing the
role of efficiency.
As was already indicated above, a popular argument in much organization sciences
literature is that efficiency facilitates a firm's profitability and, thus, survival chances. In effect,
this argument dominates IO-economics for centuries now through the heavy emphasis on the
analysis of perfect competition. The current magnum opus of IO in this respect are the
theories of perfect contestability (Baumol, Panzar & Willig, 1982) and industry structure
(Panzar, 1989), which prove mathematically why and how cost efficiencies determine entry
and exit processes as well as industry structure equilibria. These theories are consistent with
the assumption of standard economic theory which postulates that, given natural selection,
profit-maximizing and thus efficient firms will survive and, hence, dominate in reality (Alchian,
10
     Winter (1975) opposes against this argument. With Nelson he developed an alternative framework: evolutionary6
economics (Nelson & Winter, 1982). This theory emphasizes the role of organizational routines, which is a concept akin
to OE's relative inertia. However, in the evolutionary economics argument changing routines - and hence organizational
adaptation - still impedes failure rates. Therefore, the divergence from economic rationality reasoning is only a matter of
degree. For the sake of brevity, evolutionary economics is ignored here. Winter (1990) relates this theory to OE.
     This argument illustrates that the notions of profit-maximization, flexibility and efficiency are intricately related.7
Theoretically, all combinations are thinkable (e.g,. a nonprofit-maximizing but efficient firm). However, introducing these
subtleties in this paper would unneccessarily complicate the argument.
1950; Friedman, 1953; and Machlup, 1967). Again, applying OE-reasoning may produce a6
different prediction. That is, if the drive for efficiency introduces the need for changing
structures, processes and strategies, the downside of reduced inertia may dominate the
immediate benefit of cost decreases. Here, Hannan & Freeman (1989: 34) refer to the7
necessity to correct the "overemphasis of the role of efficiency considerations" in organization
sciences. In effect, they (1989: 339) argue that "[a]lthough we recognize that considerations of
efficiency have powerful consequences for many kinds of organizations, we feel that they do
not obviously override institutional and political considerations". Proposition 2 relates to this
argument.
PROPOSITION 2. An efficient (i.e., low-cost) but profit-maximizing (i.e., flexible) firm
may well be outcompeted by an inefficient (i.e., high-cost) but
nonprofit-maximizing (i.e., managerially inert) rival. In the extreme,
the latter firm may even survive at the expense of the former.
So, Proposition 2 introduces the inefficiency-may-survive argument on top of Proposition 1's
prediction as to the viability of nonprofit-maximizing (managerially inert) behavior.
Propositions 1 and 2 really oppose OE-reasoning with traditional strategic choice and IO-
predictions. However, there is a literature that emphasizes that this pparent 'or'-story really is
a matter of 'and'. That is, it may well be that a firm must seek flexibility and inertia, rather than
either of the two. An example of this argument is Burgelman (1991), pointing out that an
organization should combine an inert core with a flexible pheriphery as this combination
permits the firm to be reliable without loosing its ability to adapt. This type of reasoning
suggest that there is an 'optimal' degree of what we may call 'flexertia'. From a contingency
perspective, we assume that this optimal degree of flexertia depends upon environmental
contingencies. For example, flexibility may dominate in young and high-tech industries,
whereas inertia may be crucial in old and low-tech markets. Proposition 3 strikes this middle
ground.
PROPOSITION 3. Depending upon a number of environmental contingencies (i.e.,
carrying capacity, cost level and the rival's decision rule), an
optimal (i.e., 'profit-maximizing') degree of (i.e., managerial)
'flexertia' can be calculated.
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     Rotemberg (1994) offers an interesting model in which unorthodox motives are introduced at the work floor, rather8
than the management level. Rotemberg, too, deviates from the 'extreme rationality' assumption by introducing what he
calls 'rational altruism', which is well known from the work of Nobel Prize winner Gary Becker. The key finding is that a
worker's altruism (tendency to cooperate) is rational (utility maximizing) if workers' payments depend upon joint profit.
So, Rotemberg's setting is completely different from this paper's model. Rotemberg analyzes team work on the internal
work floor of a firm, whereas the present paper focuses on managerial behavior in the face of ext rnal c mpetition.
However, the introduction of work floor behavior in a game-theoretic model of OE is an interesting avenue for future
research.
     Note that both Van Lier & Van Witteloostuijn (1993) and Van Witteloostuijn (1997) assume that a firm derives utility9
from absolute sales: i.e., u = w + "s .t t t
Proposition 3 describes what we may call the profit-maximization paradox. To maximize its
profitability it may be that a firm should behave as if decision making is guided by nonprofit-
maximizing rules. We will discuss the interpretation of this paradox in the next section, from
both OE and IO-perspectives. Together, Propositions 1 to 3 are clear examples of th
counterintuitive predictions that may follow from OE-related reasoning. This paper provides a
theoretical underpinning of such OE-related hypotheses by developing a mathematical game
theory in which (non)profit maximization, (in)efficiency and selection are introduced so as to
prove all three propositions in a competitive Cournot setting. It is to this model that we now
turn.
A GAME-THEORETIC MODEL
Model structure
The model introduces direct strategic competition in the form of a Cournot duopoly: two
incumbent firms compete over output by deciding on the supply volume they offer to the
demand side of the market. Detailed accounts of the model, including all proofs and results,
are presented in Van Lier & Van Witteloostuijn (1993). The key issue in Proposition 1 is that
nonprofit-maximizing behavior may facilitate survival. Therefore, the model builds on a specific
class of game-theoretic models which explores the consequences of nonprofit-maximizing
firm behavior in a competitive setting. Particularly interesting (game-theoretic) models in this
tradition are presented by Vickers (1985), Fershtman & Judd (1987) and Sklivas (1987). In all8
these papers, firms are assumed to have sales (growth) next to profit objectives, which
introduces an element of organizational size and departs from the extreme rationality
postulate commonly imposed in orthodox game-theoretic contributions. The present model
starts from this framework of within-firm delegation by incorporating the assumption that firms
maximize a combination of profits and sales growth. In a period t a firm maxi izes a utility (u)t
function that comprises two elements: profit (w) and sales growth (s - s ). Thus,t t t-1
u = w + "(s - s ), (1)t t t t-1
where " is a parameter that indicates the relative importance of the sales growth component.9
So, this paper applies Hannan & Freeman's (1989) resistance-against-reorganization
12
     The n-firm case is explored in Van Lier & Van Witteloostuijn (1993). Basically, the results remain qualitatively10
identical when moving from a duopoly setting to Cournot competition with n (n > 2) firms.
argument to managers facing a downsizing option. In this paper's model, the parameter "
reflects an aspect of Hannan & Freeman's 'political costs' in the case of retrenchment.
Managerial inertia plays a key role in the model by the essential driver ", which represents the
management's preference for high sales growth. With " > 0 this is clear from Equation (1): if
the firm faces decline (s - s  < 0), then "(s - s ) contributes negatively to utility, whereast t-1 t t-1
the opposite occurs in times of growth [as then s - s > 0, implying that "(s - s ) > 0].t t-1 t t-1
For the sake of simplicity, this paper is restricted to duopoly competition. Two firms10
compete over quantities (Cournot). Hence, firms decide on output only. Note that s = 0
indicates exit. The inverse demand function is
p = d - S, (2)t t t
which reflects a standard downward-sloping function with p denoting price, d being a demand
size parameter and S reflecting market supply (that is, the sum of the output volumes of firm
1, s , and firm 2, s). Equation (2) implies that the market price is negatively correlated with1 2
market supply (that is, demand increases if the market price falls, or vice versa). Note that d
is a proxy of OE's notion of carrying capacity: .e., carrying capacity increases with d. Profit is
w = (p-c)s, where c denotes average cost and (p-c) the profit margin. Substitution of the
inverse demand function (2) into decision rule (1) determines a firm's output choice. That is, in
a period t+1 firm i produces the output volume s that maximizesit+1
u  = (d - s  - s - c)s  + " (s  - s ), (3)t+1 t t+1 t t+1 t+1 t
i j i i i i i
where i,j = 1,2 and i  j, and with the Cournot-Nash expectation that the rival will sustain the
last period's output volume. Note that firm i's sales volume increases with carrying capacity (d)
and firm i's downward inertia (" ), and falls with the estimated sale volume of firm j (s) andi j
firm i's average cost (c). This completes the model. Standard calculation of the Cournot-Nashi
solution gives the equilibrium values of output and profit for both firms. The Cournot-Nash
equilibrium tool helps to calculate the firms' output decisions from which neither of the rivals is
willing to depart, given the strategy of the opponent. The outcome is contingent upon the
values of the parameters d, " , " , c  and c. Varying the values of these five parameters1 2 1 2
generates a large number of equilibria.
Model outcomes
By way of illustration, this paper discusses a limited number of specific classes of equilibria
that shed new light on our understanding of the consequences of managerial inertia for
13
     The present model differs substantially from previous 'nonprofit-maximizing' models on which it is based (Vickers,11
1985; Fershtman & Judd, 1987; and Sklivas, 1987) in two ways. First, it explores the consequences of between-firm
differences in managerial inertia on equilibrium outcomes by introducing "-asymmetry. Second, it explicitly incorporates
firm exit (i.e., organizational mortality). As a result, the equilibrium outcomes presented in the present paper have, to our
knowledge, not been explored elsewhere. Moreover, the current paper moves beyond Van Witteloostuijn (1997) by
calculating the 'optimal' level of downward inertia (see Figure 1 below) and interpreting the model in terms of OE.
market competition and firm performance. Consider first Proposition 1 by focusing on the11
case of cost homogeneity  (c = c, implying that both firms are equally efficient) and favorable1 2
market demand (that is, c < d). The latter condition implies that in the standard Cournot
duopoly equilibrium ("  = "  = 0) both firms operate profitably. The following two classes of1 2
equilibrium outcomes (A-B) are particularly interesting.
A. If both firms are characterized by substantial managerial inertia, damaging competition
occurs that drives profits toward or below zero, depending on the force of inertia.
Although demand conditions reflect profit opportunities, price eventually falls below the
level of average cost as a result of excessive market supply. Firm 1 is larger than firm 2 if
"  > " , and vice versa. Note that in the region where profit is positive for both firms (i.e.,1 2
if "  + "  < d - c), the relatively more inert firm is also the more profitable one. The reason1 2
for this is that the relatively inert firm has higher sales than its relatively profit-maximizing
rival, while both face an identical price-cost margin.
B. If firm j is characterized by 'excessive' managerial inertia compared to its rival ("  > > " ),j i
the relatively flexible firm i is expelled from the market and the inert firm j survives. The
reason is that firm i no longer perceives a viable niche due to the expansion of firm j: the
inert firm j has expanded output beyond the profitable threshold (i.e., such that price, p, is
below cost, c). Although market demand would enable two firms to produce profitably,
even the surviving monopolist captures negative returns.
These two classes of equilibrium outcomes suggest that managerial inertia induces
endogenous cut-throat competition, even in munificent environments. That is, environmental
decline does not seem to be a necessary condition for cut-throat competition to occur, as is
frequently assumed. In fact, the equilibrium outcomes of the game only change quantitatively,
and not qualitatively, in the case of environmental decline. More specifically, the incidence of
exit, as described in equilibrium class B, goes up if demand decreases (d 9) [and, for that
matter, if cost increases (c 8)]. Thus, the likelihood that a profit-maximizing firm will be
expelled from the market by a managerially inert firm increases if demand decreases. When
both firms prefer growth, both will stand the test of environmental decline, although the market
is nonviable in terms of profitability (i.e., c > d). In that case, economic motives for operation
are overruled by the force of managerial inertia. 
Proposition 2 goes against the efficiency-favors-survival argument. In the model the
efficiency argument is introduced by assuming that cost is asymmetric (i.e., c  c). Standardi j
economic intuition predicts that the low-cost (efficient) firm will grow and/or survive. However,
a re-analysis of the model with efficiency differences reveals that this is not necessarily the
14
     Moreover, for "  < "  < "  managerial inertia does also pay, albeit suboptimally.12 H i R
case. The following two classes of equilibrium outcomes (C-D) are particularly illustrative.
C. Given favorable demand (d > c), cost asymmetry (c > c) associated with asymmetrici j
managerial inertia ("  > " ) results in a profit-making duopoly with an inefficient markei j
leader, firm i, and an efficient follower, firm j.
D. If an inefficient firm i is characterized by substantial managerial inertia compared to its
rival ("  > > " ), the inefficient firm i drives out the efficient firm j. The result is ani j
inefficient, managerially-inert, loss-making monopoly. The latter outcome is robust to
changes in the demand regime (from favorable, d > c, to unfavorable, d < c).
The key finding here is that a relatively inert firm may outcompete a relatively flexible rival -
either by growing into the market leader or by expanding into a monopolist - even if the former
faces a cost disadvantage (see also Ghemawat & Nalebuff, 1985 & 1990). Again, introducing
strategic competition alone - that is, in a munificent demand environment - is sufficient to
generate this result. Overall, the equilibrium classes A-D communicate the message that 
profit-maximizing firm may be at a disadvantage if a rival 'blindly' pursues a sales-growth-
maximizing strategy, even if the former is more efficient.
   A final issue is that the model permits to calculate the 'optimal' level of flexertia (Van Lier &
Van Witteloostuijn, 1993). This is Proposition 3. That is, given the sales motivation of rival j
(reflected in " ) firm i can compute the level of managerial inertia (implied by " ) thatj i
maximizes profit or minimizes losses (and vice versa). Figure 1 illustrates this point.
[Insert Figure 1 about here]
First, take curve I. In point C firm i captures maximum profits (or minimum losses in the case
of curves II and III), w, with the inertia-determining parameter "  being fixed at (d-c-" )/4. Thei i j
result is a profit if c < d (that is, if the environment is favorable) and "  < d-c (that is, if the rivalj
does not drive strategic competition to the limit). Hence, for a specific range of values of "
[i.e., from "  = 0 to "  = (d-c-" )/4] in Figure 1 firm i does not face a profit-growth tradeoff,L H j
provided that demand is favorable (c < d) and rival j is relatively flexible ("  < d-c). That is,j 12
under specific circumstances firm i can increase the rate of profit and growth. Of course, the
nature of the profit-growth linkage of firm i hinges upon the strategy of rival j. With decreasing
demand (or increasing cost, for that matter) and/or reduced flexibility of firm i, the w-" curv  I
in Figure 1 shifts to the south-west (cf. the curves II and III). Note, however, that for a
reasonable range of parameter values (c < d and "  < d-c) a profit-maximizing level ofj
managerial inertia can indeed be calculated.
The interpretation of the endogeneity or exogeneity of " is paradigm dependent. From an
OE-perspective, " may be the result of imprinted routines, rules and procedures reflected in
an organizational culture that 'urges' management to seek growth, even at the expense of
profitability so as to avoid political costs. The observation that an organizational culture is
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difficult to change, particularly if facing downsizing, is well established in the literatur
(Hofstede, 1991). Then, population dynamics will take care of the selection of firms with fitting
"'s. So, the profit-maximization paradox is solved by Darwinian market selection, without the
relatively inert firms being able to adapt their imprinted "'s to environmental contingencies.
Selection thus operates on the "-dimension (the degree of flexertia) rather than the c-
dimension (relative efficiency). From a strategic choice and industrial organization angle, the
adaptation argument would be emphasized. That is, " may be manipulated purposedly by
designing an 'optimal' organizational structure or management compensation scheme. This is
the way agency theory treats issues of managerial behavior. For example, Fershtman & Judd
(1987) and Sklivas (1987) examine the strategic advantage that can be derived from
alternative compensation schemes. Basically, they show that owners can increase the profit of
their firm in a Cournot setting, ceteris paribus, by paying the managers on the basis of
obtained (absolute) profit and sales. That is, managers are paid G = $P + (1-$)S, where G
denotes the manager's salary, P profit, S sales and 0 < $  1. As in our model, the result is
that firms behave more aggressively in the Cournot output game. So, the profit-maximization
paradox is now solved by transferring the assumption of profit-maximizing behavior to the
owners, rather than the managers, where profit-maximizing owners may install incentives that
impose nonprofit-maximizing behavior upon their managers.
APPRAISAL
The aim of this paper was to demonstrate that considerable progress can be made
concerning our understanding of the relationships between relative inertia, market competition
and firm performance by integrating the conceptual richness of OE with the analytical rigor of
IO's game-theoretic modeling. The main outcomes of the model presented above can be
summarized as follows. First, managerial inertia through nonprofit-maximizing behavior may
facilitate organizational survival, which is in support of the key argument of OE that relative
inertia is a consequence of selection (Proposition 1). Second, an inefficient and inert - i.e.,
nonprofit-maximizing - firm may survive, notwithstanding the accumulation of losses, at th
detriment of a relatively profit-motivated and efficient rival (Proposition 2). Third, knowing the
sales motivation of the rival i, the profit-maximizing level of managerial inertia for firm j can be
calculated (Proposition 3). This third finding is particularly interesting. In effect, this result goes
halfway both extreme positions in the flexibility-inertia debate by suggesting that neither being
inert (OE) nor being flexible (strategic choice theory) per se is the universal remedy against
organizational failure, where the interpretation of the associated profit-maximization paradox is
paradigm dependent. As the well-established contingency theory would suggest: it depends.
That is, knowing the environmental conditions and the rivals' characteristics, a fitting level of
inertia (or flexibility, for that matter) can be determined. This conclusion is nicely reflected in
Hambrick and D'Aveni's (1988) study into organizational failure: neither strategic passivity (too
much inertia) nor strategic hyperactivity (too much flexibility) enhances survival chances. The
bottom line is that "[p]ure profit maximizing behavior may be at the expense of organizational
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survival" (D'Aveni, 1989b: 135). In our model this is because pure profit-maximizing firms are
the likely victims of strategic competition, and in D'Aveni's (1989b) argument this follows from
the status capital that is associated with prestigious but expensive managers.
As far as cut-throat competition is concerned, two important considerations are
suggested by the model. First, the argument that firms should be flexible in the face of
turbulent environments is indeed precarious, as our model reveals that managerial inertia may
facilitate survival. It is important to stress, however, that in the present game highly inert firms
survive at the detriment of profit-maximizing firms not without a cost: that is, the former ar
prepared to sacrifice profits, even to the extent of a long-run loss, for the sake of survival and
large size. This outcome is not that surprising as revealing examples can be found of
surviving companies that accumulate(d) losses for several years in a row (examples being
General Motors in the U.S. and Hoogovens in The Netherlands). For an account of
permanently failing organizations we refer to the interesting work of Meyer & Zucker (1989). A
number of additional real-world examples seem to reveal patterns that resemble th
theoretical predictions of our model. In effect, our theoretical argument can be illustrated on
the basis of the findings of Baden-Fuller (1989) in the UK steel castings market, of Sutton
(1991) in food industries and of Van Witteloostuijn (1997) in the (petro)chemical industry. The
studies of Baden-Fuller (1989) and Van Witteloostuijn (1997) reveal that exits originate by no
means from the low-profitability (Baden-Fuller) or low-efficiency (Van Witteloostuijn) part of the
market. That is, a substantial number of unprofitable (steel castings) and inefficient
(petrochemicals) operations stayed in the market while (relatively) profitable and efficient
opponents decided to close down. Additionally, data on the largest chemical companies in the
world reveal that substantial differences prevail as to the firms' use of downsizing strategies
(Van Witteloostuijn, 1997). Firms vary considerably in their downward adjustment of sales in
times of a recession: i.e., a number of firms decreased sales in years of industry decline,
whereas others even raised their sales volume in the same periods. Finally, Sutton (1991) - on
the basis of a study in such industries as brewing, frozen food, and salt and sugar - reports
that firms that started to escalate (sunk) advertising expenditures have grown into the current
market leaders.
The observation that some firms sacrifice profits and even accumulate losses in order to
survive complicates the extant debate on the appropriateness of different outcome measures
to evaluate the success of individual companies. Two main outcome measures can b
distinguished: efficiency (with its associated measures of financial performance) and mere
survival. IO and strategic choice theory (for example, strategic group analysis) are implicitly
inclined to equate both outcome measures. More specifically, efficient and thus profitable
firms will survive in the long run. As long as both measures are related, the debate on the
appropriateness of different outcome measures is limited to its measurement properties. In
that case, we agree that survival is preferable to efficiency because "[n]othing but the absolute
test of survival is significant objectively" (Barnard, 1947: 70; see also Carroll & Swaminathan,
1992). However, more fundamental questions, which have important ramifications for OE's
selection theory, are raised if efficiency and survival are not necessarily - or sometimes even
negatively - related. To be sure, OE recognizes that selection may operate on many
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dimensions such as efficiency and inertia (or flexibility), and that the target of evolution may
change over time (Hannan & Freeman, 1989). However, virtually nothing is known on these
issues. Questions such as 'on which dimensions does selection operate?', 'in which
circumstances does the target of evolution change?' and 'when does selection favor
efficiency, inertia or both?' remain unanswered. It is clear that every selection theory, be it in
the field of economics or sociology, should give priority to answering these questions.
In our view, game-theoretic modeling may contribute to our understanding of these issues
by specifying the characteristics of surviving firms in equilibrium. Of course, for this purpose
more complex models are needed than the one presented above. In this respect, a key
limitation of our model is that the firm's profit constraint (or, to be precise, loss constraint) is
infinitive. It is more realistic to assume that institutional restrictions limit the possibility to
accumulate losses endlessly in order to remain big. For instance, following recent empirical
studies on organizational decline (D'Aveni, 1989b & 1989c), the influence of such restrictions
can be introduced by modeling creditor's confidence. Moreover, the model can be exte ded in
a number of other ways. First, in this paper's model, only retrenchment comes with a cost.
However, expansion may be assumed to be costly, too. In the well-established IO-tradition on
capacity competition, expansion (or exit) requires investment (or loss) of sunk cost in building
up (or breaking down) productive capacity (Tirole, 1988). Second, other forms of inertia may
be introduced, such as the escalation of advertising outlays. In that case, demand (d) is
endogenized rather than fixed. In this respect, Sutton (1991) convincingly shows that
modeling advertising outlays as an e dogenous sunk cost leads to important insights as to
the evolution of industry structure. It is possible that these model extensions will reveal other
interesting equilibria not covered by the present model, such as inefficient and inert firms
surviving at the detriment of efficient firms w thout incurring losses.
A second implication is that two forms of (cut-throat) competition should be distinguished:
exogenous versus endogenous competition. Exogenous competition is caused by
environmental dynamism - or, for that matter, relative shifts in the carrying capacity of
populations - examples being a decline in demand as a result of shifting customer tastes or an
increase in the density of a population following increased entry. Exogenous competition is
therefore tantamount to increases in diffuse competition. Endogenous competition is the
result of increases in direct rivalry among firms within a population in the form of strategic
moves. The IO-literature suggests that these strategic moves, in turn, (should) induce
organizational or managerial inertia (Dixit, 1982; and Ghemawat, 1991). More specifically,
path dependence not only exists at the system level (Carroll & Harrison, 1993) but also at the
organizational and managerial level, as prior decisions or strategic moves affect current and
future decisions or moves. Thus, strategic moves, inertia and path dependencies are
intricately related. It is argued that these processes may have a profound impact on the extent
of competition and therefore, eventually, on the structure of an entire industry or population. A
first case in point is the important outcome of our model that a profit-maximizing firm is
unlikely to survive when confronted with a managerially inert rival. The point is that if one firm
develops a habit with respect to sustaining or building market share, the profit-maximizing firm
has no choice but to follow the leader, providing it wants to survive. So, the inert firm induces
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cut-throat competition and erodes the profits of both firms. Another case in point is the
escalation of competition in advertising-intensive industries, as described by Sutton (1991).
Game-theoretic modeling with endogenous sunk (advertising) cost allows Sutton (1991) to
formulate robust predictions as to the evolution of the structure of advertising-intensive
industries. More specifically, the competitive escalation of advertising outlays in such
industries inevitably leads to the survival of only a limited number of, heavily advertised,
leading firms. Note that the escalation of advertising outlays is a specific form of path
dependence or inertia.
Finally, in our view more effort is needed to integrate theories of diffuse (or exogenous)
and direct (or endogenous) competition. Until now, OE has focused on diffuse competition
and relative shifts in the carrying capacity of populations as the main trigger of organizational
selection. We suggest that endogenous processes, shaped by inertia and path dependencies
at the organizational or managerial level, may be as salient as exogenous processes in
shaping the evolution of industries or populations. In any case, a theory of competition should
incorporate both diffuse and direct processes (see also Hannan & Carroll, 1992; and Singh,
1993). We are convinced that considerable progress can be made on this issue by cross-
fertilizing IO's insights on direct competition with OE's notions of diffuse competition. Here, we
strongly believe that the game-theoretic methodology is the natural candidate to achieve this.
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